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ABSTRACT. Society is faced with a range of contemporary threats to everyday life, from natural and technological hazards to accidents
and terrorism. These are embodied within integrated emergency management arrangements that are designed to enhance preparedness
and response to such incidents, and in turn facilitate a prompt recovery. Such arrangements must be inherently dynamic and evolve as
new threats emerge or as existing threats change. An example of the latter is the changing nature of flooding, which is projected to
increase in both frequency and severity with climate change. Recognizing this evolving threat, we focus on the evaluation of the
effectiveness of domestic Flood Emergency Management Systems (FEMS) as components of integrated emergency management
arrangements. Despite the extensive body of literature that documents success conditions of so-called effective emergency management
more broadly, there have been only a few attempts to construct a comprehensive evaluation framework to support objective assessment
and cross-country comparison. Addressing this gap, we formulate an evaluation framework specifically tailored to the study of FEMS
in Europe, which is then provisionally applied to the study of FEMS in England (UK), France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden.
Important differences are observed in how FEMS have evolved in relation to differing contextual backgrounds (political, cultural,
administrative, and socio-economic) and exposures to flood hazard. From this provisional assessment, a number of opportunities for,
and constraints to, enhancing the effectiveness of FEMS in Europe are discerned. The evaluation framework thus serves as an important
stepping stone for further indepth inquiry, and as a valuable tool for future comparative study.
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INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly “risky” society (Beck 1992), emergency
management is firmly situated in policy and public discourse as
an essential system for protection, preparedness, and response to
contemporary threats. Moreover, as new threats emerge or as
existing threats evolve, so too must emergency management
systems. The effectiveness of such systems is dependent upon a
number of factors, which are well documented with the fields of
crisis and disaster management, safety science, and public
administration, such as the need for mechanisms that facilitate
coordination, collaboration, and communication (e.g., Boin and
’t Hart 2010). However, there have been only a few attempts to
translate these findings into an operational framework for
evaluating emergency management systems (McConnell 2011,
Bossong and Hegemann 2013, Kuipers et al. 2015) or disaster
management systems (Cardona et al. 2005, Carreño et al. 2007).
Such a framework could play a valuable role in monitoring the
progress of current systems and identifying their strengths and
weaknesses, as well as function as a tool for facilitating cross-
country comparisons. Although considerable lessons can be
acquired through comparative research, arguably this has been
constrained by the tendency for researchers to examine emergency
management in country silos, and by the absence of common
standards or methodology for facilitating comparability.  
Addressing this neglected research gap, we present a
comprehensive framework for evaluating the effectiveness of
domestic Flood Emergency Management Systems (FEMS) in
Europe. The decision to focus on FEMS is justified on the basis
of mounting scientific evidence that projects the increased
frequency and severity of floods in the future (Feyen et al. 2012).
Indeed, recent flood events in Europe, such as the flash flooding
in the French Riviera in October 2015, the winter 2015/16 floods
in England, and the spring 2016 floods throughout the European
continent, serve as poignant reminders of the devastation that
can be caused in terms of loss of life, disruption, and economic
losses. In order to test this framework, it is applied to the FEMS
of selected EU Member States, including England (UK), France,
the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. These countries were
selected because they present different flood risk profiles, as well
as different cultural, socio-economic, administrative, and political
backgrounds through which emergency management has evolved.
While this maximizes comparative opportunity (Azarian 2011),
these countries also reflect a shared set of normative standards
and visions for effective emergency management (Alexander et
al. 2016, Ek et al. 2016, Kaufmann et al. 2016, Larrue et al. 2016,
Matczak et al. 2016), which makes it possible to formulate relevant
benchmarks to assess current performance.  
We firstly summarize the existing literature from which indicators
and corresponding benchmarks were identified. Next, the
methodology for both developing and then applying the
evaluation framework is outlined. Drawing from cross-
disciplinary research conducted within the EU project STAR-
FLOOD, the evaluation framework is employed as a tool for
identifying the strengths and constraints to the effectiveness of
FEMS in the selected countries. We reflect critically on these
observations and their implications for enhancing the
effectiveness of FEMS in Europe. For insight into the broader
project findings from STAR-FLOOD, the reader is referred to
Hegger et al. (2016).
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Emergency management refers to a broad set of functions and is
typically conceptualized in a cyclic form, organized according to
distinct phases that capture the proactive and reactive responses to
a hazard situation (Haddow and Bullock 2006, Waugh and Streib
2006). Although the origins of this cycle are somewhat contested,
it has been employed as a heuristic device for analysis for circa 40
years (Neal 1997, Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012). Moreover, there
is a strong consensus regarding the key phases of emergency
management, although how these phases are delineated has
influenced the number of phases conceptualized by authors (Baird
et al. 1975). Simply put, emergency management can be divided
into three broad phases, as follows:  
1. Emergency preparedness groups the day-to-day activities
performed by emergency professionals (i.e., pre-event,
proactive phase); these may include assessments of risk,
emergency planning, training and exercising, and community-
engagement activities. 
2. Emergency response refers to the activities initiated for a
specific hazard event, such as risk mitigation (e.g., installing
demountable defenses), rescue operations, continuity
management, and coordination of multiagency response (i.e.,
reactive phase). 
3. Recovery activities in emergency management are typically
limited to the immediate aftermath of a hazard event, such as
rehousing displaced people, addressing welfare needs, and
restoring critical services.
 
Emergency management is distinguished from discussions of crisis/
disaster management, where the latter is often associated with
events or stressors that exceed capacities of “normal workaday
systems to cope with them effectively” (Alexander 2003:118), and
thus requires some form of external assistance (i.e., outside the
domestic system, such as the EU Civil Protection Mechanism)
(UNOOSA 2015). Disasters can be viewed as events that signify
the collapse of the predictable and ordered world (Dynes 1998). In
contrast, emergency management concerns the “ordinary,” rather
than extraordinary, types of events that can be managed through
the use of existing resources and established procedures (Alexander
2003, Henstra 2010). Nonetheless, there are clear synergies and even
dependencies between the two; thus, both sources of literature were
reviewed as part of this research.  
While there is an extensive body of literature that examines the
performance and effectiveness of emergency management
arrangements, there have been few attempts to operationalize these
findings into a comprehensive objective framework for evaluating
emergency management systems, not least FEMS, which are the
focus of this research. Operationalizing the criterion of
effectiveness requires the identification of relevant indicators that
are “transparent, robust and representative,” alongside
corresponding benchmarks to measure “the distance between
current conditions and an objective threshold” (Carreño et al.
2007:1). To begin, this section reviews existing studies on emergency
management where similar attempts to formulate an evaluation
framework have been attempted. Next, on the basis of a thematic
analysis of the emergency management literature, we identify the
emergent themes and preconditions, which underscore the
evaluation framework developed as part of this study.
Lessons from existing evaluation frameworks of emergency
management systems
There have been similar attempts at formulating evaluation
frameworks of emergency management systems, albeit they are
limited in number or are designed to satisfy specific objectives.
Nonetheless, valuable lessons can be drawn and applied to the study
of FEMS. For example, analysis of Civil Security Systems (CSS)
within 22 EU Member States highlighted important differences in
the distribution of responsibilities, legal frameworks, and
operational practices (Bossong and Hegemann 2013, Kuipers et al.
2015). While these observations have implications for enhancing
the capacity of transboundary crisis management, structural
aspects of CSS were not shown to impact the effectiveness of
domestic CSS per se (Bossong and Hegemann 2013). Evaluation
was conducted on the basis of postevent inquiries, with some
insights from stakeholder interviews. However, the authors
acknowledge the limitations of this approach, given the diverse and
intermittent nature of evaluation practices and absence of
“common standards for effectiveness assessment in Europe”
(Bossong and Hegemann 2013:39). Arguably, the ambition to
provide an all-hazard holistic assessment of CCS exacerbates the
evaluation challenge. Nonetheless, of interest to this paper are the
recurring factors that seem to constrain CSS. These include
problems in coordination, planning and preparation, control, and
local expertise. However, while Bossong and Hegemann (2013) and
Kuipers et al. (2015) take an important step forward in terms of
developing an assessment framework for assessing the quality of
CSS, according to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and
legitimacy, they neglect to develop the necessary benchmarks for
ensuring consistency and comparability in cross-country
assessments.  
Similarly, McConnell (2011) presents a heuristic framework for
evaluating the “success” of crisis management according to
processes, decisions, and politics dimensions. A number of
assessment criteria are proposed and related to both factual (e.g.,
adherence to procedures) and perceptive elements of success (e.g.,
societal support). McConnell asserts the importance of examining
the contextual capacities and constraints, organizational
hierarchies, and political systems within which decisions are made.
In agreement with McConnell’s “shades of grey” interpretation,
the evaluation framework we present equally recognizes that
effective and ineffective aspects of FEMS may coexist, and can
impact upon success of the overall system.  
More broadly in the disaster field, Cardona et al. (2004, 2005) and
Carreño et al. (2007) put forward a Risk Management performance
Index (RMI) comprising a disaster management subindex to
quantify the effectiveness of organizational abilities and capacity
to plan and address the consequences of disasters. These include
six indicators related to the (1) organization and coordination of
emergency operations, (2) emergency response planning and
implementation of warning systems, (3) endowment of equipment,
tools, and infrastructure, (4) simulation, updating, and test of
interinstitutional response, (5) community preparedness and
training, and (6) rehabilitation and reconstruction planning. Each
indicator is qualified by experts in emergency management and
academia, using a 1 to 5 scale to determine the scale of achievement
against the desired state (“objective threshold”), based on the model
presented by Cardona et al. (2004, 2005). The composite RMI is
applied to Latin America and the Caribbean as part of a cross-
country comparison, and is therefore inherently coarse in its
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resolution. Nonetheless, the method of “scoring” indicators
according to an agreed optimum state provides a pragmatic and
semi-objective means to assess each indicator in a consistent way
to ensure comparability. We adopt a similar approach (see the
methodology section).  
Lessons can also be drawn from assessment frameworks employed
in practice. For example, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) provides a Continuity Assistance Tool (CAT)
to assist organizations in their ability to assess and strengthen
continuity capabilities during an emergency situation (FEMA
2013). The CAT establishes industry-wide benchmarks to assess
the performance of key continuity management functions. The
key elements for effective continuity capability broadly relate to
the organizational elements (e.g., orders of succession, delegation
of authority), resource elements (e.g., human resources,
continuity communications), training and exercising, and
reconstitution elements. This self-assessment tool is based on a
series of questions from which the tally of yes/no responses can
be used to identify gaps in current capability. The subjective nature
of this approach instills a degree of flexibility by acknowledging
the varied occupations and needs of different organizations, and
is an important strength of the tool.  
Drawing from these influential frameworks, and the emergency
management literature more widely, there are a number of
recurring themes and preconditions for so-called effective
emergency management.
Emergency preparedness
Strategic and operational planning for emergency response is seen
as a standard precondition for effective emergency management
and is formally established in the “grey literature” of the studied
countries, as well as through academic studies dating back to the
1970s (e.g., Lewis et al. 1976, as cited in Coetzee and van Niekerk
2012). An emergency plan essentially constitutes a coordinated
set of protocols for managing an adverse event (Alexander
2005:159). Proactive (pre-event) emergency planning is widely
regarded as essential for establishing priorities, systematic
response start-up, coordinated operational action, and tactical
decision-making (Alexander 2002, Boin and t’ Hart 2010).
Moreover, planning plays a vital role in defining the roles and
responsibilities of emergency practitioners (Henstra 2010,
FEMA 2013). A fundamental aspect of planning is to ensure
business continuity; i.e., the ability to perform and maintain
service provision during an emergency situation (Henstra 2010).
Thus, planning requires consideration of the continuity of
facilities (from which leadership and operations will function),
communication channels, record management, and resourcing
procedures (FEMA 2013). Although meticulous planning is
required, the nature of certain types of hazard events (i.e.,
unpredictable, sudden onset, or unexpected) inherently requires
capacity to be flexible and spontaneous (Perry and Lindell 2003,
Waugh and Streib 2006).  
Acknowledging the lack of a homogeneous standard for
emergency planning, Alexander (2005) presents a series of
standards for an all-hazard emergency plan at the local authority
scale. Such generic plans should outline the legal framework and
the jurisdiction and scope of the plan, include vulnerability/risk
analyses according to scenario-based assessments, specify
protocols and procedures (e.g., evacuation procedures and
arrangements for warning the public), and clearly define the roles
and responsibilities of emergency actors. Alexander encourages
the use of these standards as a means of evaluating the quality of
planning documents via a judgement-based scoring system,
although this is not fully developed. The framework we present
incorporates many of these standards summarized by Alexander
(2005). However, while Alexander, among others (e.g.,
Quarantelli 2000), asserts the importance of generic “all hazards”
planning for its efficiency and ability to accommodate the
potential for unexpected events, there is also an argument that
hazard-specific planning could be helpful where a significant risk
exists. Flooding is a pertinent example, given its rising frequency
and severity in Europe (Feyen et al. 2012). Hence, the decision in
this research is to focus on FEMS, only. Thus, it is argued that
flood-specific planning should accompany generic emergency
planning.
The distribution of responsibilities within and between emergency
actors
A key precondition for effective emergency management is an
organizational structure whereby roles and responsibilities are
clearly apportioned (Zhou et al. 2011, FEMA 2013), albeit the
literature does not prescribe a “perfect model” or assert how such
an organizational structure should be substantively established.
Indeed, Quarantelli (2000) observes the heterogeneity of civil
protection arrangements worldwide and variation of highly
centralized systems (e.g., Japan, America) to decentralized
systems (e.g., Australia). These differences “simply reflect the
prevailing political, economic and cultural patterns of different
societies” (Quarantelli 2000:15). Nonetheless, a number of
recurring and more generalized criteria can be identified as
relevant for the effectiveness of emergency management from an
organizational perspective. Given that emergency management is
of a multiactor and multilevel nature in all studied countries, there
should, firstly, be a clear division of responsibilities (i.e.,
administrative, coordinative, and operational) of all actors
involved, regardless of whether they are public, quasi-public, or
private (Zhou et al. 2011). It should, moreover, be clear to all
actors what their responsibilities, and those of others, include, for
instance regarding the upscaling or downscaling of
responsibilities, chains of command and control, and transferring
responsibilities through different phases of emergency
management (e.g., response to recovery) (FEMA 2013). Lastly,
responsibilities should be accompanied by proper powers and
competencies in order to make them effective.  
Closely related to the need for a clear organizational structure,
emphasized in the repository of research and grey literature, is
the importance of the “three Cs”: coordination, collaboration,
and communication between emergency actors. The capacity of
different types of actors to collaborate is generally seen as the
foundation of effective emergency management (e.g., Britton
2001, Waugh and Streib 2006). This is necessary, given that
different types of actors invariably operate within different
organizational cultures and vary in their responsibilities, skills,
expertise, and core functions (Alexander et al. 2013). In this
respect, Waugh and Streib (2006) stress the importance of
organizational cultures whereby collaboration and cooperation
are embedded. This is increasingly seen in developed countries
where a discursive shift toward the notion of Integrated
Emergency Management is witnessed, whereby partnerships and
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forms of horizontal and vertical governance are required (Drabek
1985, Kuipers et al. 2015, Gilissen et al. 2016).  
Correspondingly, the nature of emergency management has
changed from a directive task to one that is fundamentally a
coordination task requiring the “skills and expertise, resources,
and political authority to be brought together to ensure effective
mitigation, response and recovery” (Britton 2001:52).
Mechanisms for coordination and collaboration are required at
the operational scale to ensure effective multiactor working (Boin
and ’t Hart 2010). Furthermore, communication pathways and
exchange of information are considered essential (Drabek 1985,
Boin and ’t Hart 2010). Communication also plays a crucial role
in facilitating institutional learning and promoting adaptation to
improve the long-term effectiveness of emergency management
(O’Brien et al. 2010).  
This is echoed by Zhou et al. (2011), who employ factor analysis
and fuzzy logic to identify five Critical Success Factors for
effective and efficient emergency management: (1) organizational
structure and clear division of responsibilities, (2) effective
systems for transferring information, (3) government unity of
leadership to plan and coordinate as a whole, (4) application of
logistics technology, and (5) the need for continuous improvement
of the operational system as a whole.
Institutional learning
Another factor that enhances the effectiveness of emergency
management is the implementation of procedures and
mechanisms for institutional learning (Real-Dato 2009).
Institutional learning mechanisms aim to increase the skillfulness,
responsiveness, and proficiency of emergency actors and
organizations, and to continuously improve the emergency
management system as a whole (Zhou et al. 2011). These include
pre-event arrangements, such as exercising and training
mechanisms, consultative structures, professional fora, and
information systems, but also postevent arrangements, such as
internal or external evaluation mechanisms (Real-Dato 2009).
Testing, training, and exercising is identified by FEMA (2013) as
a key means of preparing personnel and ensuring that they are
capable of carrying out their responsibilities and procedures to
guarantee continuity. In addition, with regard to training courses
designed to prepare participants for a specific role and their
operational responsibilities, Alexander (2003) also discusses the
importance of educational courses geared toward enhancing
general understanding and theoretical knowledge of emergency
management. In order to optimize their effectiveness, institutional
learning arrangements should be implemented both within
organizations and at integrated subsystem levels.
Stakeholder and community preparedness
A low level of stakeholder preparedness to risks is generally seen
as a major constraint to the effective implementation of risk-
mitigating policies (Runhaar et al. 2012). Related to risk
preparedness, for instance, Runhaar et al. (2015) and Gilissen et
al. (in press) employ risk awareness and sense of urgency as
indicators for their effectiveness. Active campaigning and the
consultation of stakeholders about risks are presented as key
activities in increasing preparedness. Such activities should
preferably involve both public and private actors (e.g., emergency
management authorities and relevant sectoral branch
organizations) (Runhaar et al. 2015, Gilissen et al. in press). Apart
from informing relevant stakeholders and communities about risks,
in order to optimize responsive potential, they should moreover be
actively engaged in preparedness activities, including risk
assessments, emergency planning, and training and exercising
(Henstra 2010).
Availability and allocation of resources
The availability of sufficient resources and the proper allocation
thereof is also necessary for effective emergency management
(Cardona et al. 2004, 2005; Carreño et al. 2007). The term
“resources” should be broadly conceptualized to include financial
resources, as well as human resources (humanpower), technological
resources (e.g., measuring equipment, communication devices),
and specific technical tools, supplies, and equipment (e.g., sand
bags, transport equipment, fire extinguishers, pumping
equipment). Resources should be available and accessible where
and when needed to those who need them in the execution of their
responsibilities. Moreover, policies, plans, and procedures for
sharing or exchanging resources, or securing additional resources,
are seen as essential for ensuring continuity capabilities at times of
crisis (FEMA 2013).
The recovery phase of emergency management
Incident recovery is widely conceived as the process of rebuilding,
restoring, and rehabilitating the community following an
emergency (Baird 2010, Cabinet Office 2012b). This may involve
evacuation, temporary shelter, welfare needs, business continuity
management, restoration of critical services, and management of
environmental impacts. To support these activities, arrangements
should be in place to ensure adequate planning for incident recovery
and the production of recovery plans that consider methods for
assessing the impact of an event and strategies for addressing those
impacts. Moreover, resources should be in place to support and
coordinate these activities. Crucially, mechanisms need to be in
place to outline the distribution of responsibilities and transition
from operational response to recovery. Often, this involves the
inclusion of other types of actors, such as the voluntary sectors, to
support additional tasks (e.g., welfare needs) (Baird 2010).
Depending on the scale of event, recovery may be steered through
national-level coordinating groups, government departments or
agencies, or local-level actors.
METHODS
Developing a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of Flood
Emergency Management Systems
To develop the evaluation framework, we performed a systematic
and comprehensive review of existing literature. Carefully
constructed search strings were used to capture all relevant material
related to the key words of “emergency management,” “crisis” and
“disaster management,” alongside terms of “effectiveness” and
“ineffectiveness,” using Boolean operators and truncation searches
within the Web of Knowledge. The resulting literature was filtered
to focus on publications post 1970. To avoid European and
American centrism, no exclusions were placed on country of origin.
Likewise, there were no exclusions for hazard type. However,
relevant contextual differences were taken into account during the
indepth review of the sampled literature. In this process, literature
related to emergency management systems, or subcomponents
thereof, at multiple scales (international, national, and subnational
scales), was examined to identify recurring performance indicators
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and benchmarks. In addition to academic literature, policy
documents (so-called grey literature) in the respective countries
were also examined to determine how “effective” emergency
management is framed.  
A thematic analysis was then performed on both the academic
and grey literature to identify the recurring themes and
preconditions for effective emergency management systems (as
outlined in the Literature Review). These were further refined and
structured according to those indicators that are relevant for
understanding flood emergency management specifically. This
was achieved by drawing synergies with emergency management
of hazards with similar etiologies (Alexander 2000), as well as
performance criteria for generic emergency response. This
resulted in the construction of a set of seven indicators for
evaluating the effectiveness of FEMS. These indicators represent
the processes and actions taken within flood emergency
management, inclusive of preparation, response, and recovery
phases, as outlined in Table 1.  
To determine the effectiveness of current FEMS in the selected
countries, a predefined set of benchmarks is put forward (Table
1). Adopting the 1 to 5 scale proposed by Cardona et al. (2004,
2005), each benchmark determines the extent to which the
indicator in question is established, ranging from absent/minimal
(1), emerging (2), and moderate (3) to significant (4) and
outstanding (5). These categories are qualified according to three
key factors, as follows:  
1. the presence of the indicator and the extent to which
elements thereof focus on flood incidents specifically—e.g.,
the presence of specified procedures and formal rules for
coordinating actors; 
2. the form in which the indicator is present—e.g., for effective
FEMS, one would expect diversified approaches to
enhancing community preparedness or locally tailored
emergency planning situated within a hierarchy of planning
documents; and 
3. the scale at which 1 and 2 are established—e.g., ad hoc
examples at the local scale are less desirable than a nationally
consistent approach.
Applying the evaluation framework
In order to test the developed evaluation framework, it was
applied to the FEMS in England, France, the Netherlands,
Poland, and Sweden by drawing from multiple data sources to
inform the assessment.  
Firstly, semistructured interviews were conducted with relevant
stakeholders, who were identified on the basis of actor mapping
to ensure representation of the current agencies, organizations,
and governmental departments involved in emergency
management, as well as flood risk management more broadly,
including policy-makers and practitioners operating at national
to local scales. The interviews addressed governance and practice
aspects of flood emergency management, such as the distribution
of responsibilities, resourcing, the effectiveness of intra- and inter-
agency working, and other aspects related to the identified
benchmarks. Interviewees were asked to reflect on the strengths
and weaknesses of the current system and the corresponding
impact on its effectiveness. These interviews were then subjected
to thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2008).
Accompanying these, workshops were conducted in each selected
country to canvas further opinion. Both interviews and
workshops were conducted between December 2013 and
February 2015 as part of the STAR-FLOOD project (Hegger et
al. 2016).  
Acknowledging the potential sources of bias associated with
interviewing professionals, a combined public administration and
legal perspective was adopted to perform an analysis of national
policy, legal documentation, public reviews into performance,
postevent inquiries, and operational planning documents. The
triangulation of data obtained via stakeholder interviews and
document analysis provided the basis for interpreting the extent
to which each benchmark is currently achieved in the respective
countries.  
The FEMS in each country were scored by the academic authors
according to the indicators/benchmarks. Despite the seeming
subjectivity of this approach, considerable efforts were made to
ensure that interpretations are embedded in these various data
sources from the respective countries. Moreover, this scoring
method was employed as a means of ensuring a degree of
objectivity, as well as consistency in national evaluations to
provide comparable data. This information was then subject to
qualitative analysis to help identify the factors supporting or
constraining the effectiveness of FEMS in the selected countries.  
The following section outlines the results for each indicator. It
should be borne in mind that specific terminology exists in each
country to refer to emergency actors. In all countries, the
distinction is made between “first responders,” who provide the
front line response to emergency events (e.g., emergency services),
and another group of actors (e.g., utility providers, transport
operators, telecommunications), who provide a supportive role in
emergency management. For clarity, we adopt the terms of first
and secondary responders; the relevant actors for each country
are outlined in Table 2.
RESULTS
By reviewing each indicator in turn, this section provides a
provisional overview of the effectiveness of current FEMS in the
selected countries. Fig. 1 shows these results and illustrates the
metaphorical “distance” between current conditions and the
desired optimum state. This analysis demonstrates how the
evaluation framework can be applied in practice and the type of
findings that can be gleaned from this type of assessment. Due
to practical constraints, only a broad-brush assessment is
presented. Nonetheless, the evaluation framework can be
conceived as an important stepping stone toward further indepth
inquiry and comparative studies in the future.
Indicator 1: Emergency planning for flood response
Emergency planning for flood response in the selected countries
is established through different arrangements (Table 3), albeit to
varying degrees (Fig. 1).  
Flood emergency planning is assessed as moderately established
in Poland and Sweden. In both countries, emergency planning
arrangements are in place, but there is only sporadic evidence of
flood-specific emergency planning. The implementation of the
EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) has been pivotal in raising the
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Table 1. Indicators (I) and benchmarks of effective Flood Emergency Management Systems. (Benchmarks are scaled as absent/minimal
[1], emerging [2], moderate [3], significant [4], and outstanding [5].)
 
Indicators and benchmarks
I.1: Emergency planning for flood response
1. Basic emergency plans are in place to inform emergency professionals about how to respond to a generic hazard event. No specific plan for flood
emergency management is in place. Plans are not tailored to local conditions. Response to an incident tends to be reactive and not informed by existing
planning.
2. As above, but there is evidence of locally tailored planning documents for generic emergencies in some places. This is not nationally consistent.
3. As above, but locally tailored planning documents are nationally consistent. There is sporadic evidence of local flood emergency plans; however, they
are not based on the periodic assessment of flood risk.
4. Nationally consistent generic and flood-specific emergency planning is established at the local or regional scale and is informed by local hazard
assessment.
5. Nationally consistent generic and flood-specific planning is established to build capacity to respond to known risks based on ongoing risk
assessment and monitoring at the local scale. Flood emergency planning integrates hazard assessment with vulnerability information (e.g., location of
critical infrastructure, population characteristics, concentrations of vulnerable groups). This accompanies and is aligned with subnational and national
planning documents.
I.2: Arrangements for institutional learning
1. There is little or no attempt to identify lessons learned from incident management.
2. Debriefing protocols are evident following a significant incident to provide an opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses in how the incident
was managed.
3. Accompanying debriefing practices, emergency management is subject to public scrutiny and review following a significant incident. On the basis of
scrutiny, attempts are made to implement lessons learned.
4. Beyond responding to a significant incident, there is evidence of a proactive culture of institutional learning, such as efforts to facilitate knowledge
exchange within and between administrative/management districts and to periodically evaluate the performance of emergency management systems.
5. Procedures are established to promote institutional learning at frequent intervals and following emergency events. Mechanisms are in place to
facilitate knowledge exchange, sharing experiences, and best practice (e.g., frequent meetings or computer-based tools that support dialogue between
emergency professionals). Emergency management is periodically subject to public scrutiny and review.
I.3: Requirements of exercising emergency arrangements
1. Exercises are initiated on an ad hoc basis in some emergency management districts, only. There are no specific provisions for flood incident
management.
2. As above, exercising is sporadic, with some examples of provisions for flood incident management.
3. Training and exercising emergency protocols is an established practice and involves relevant emergency professionals. There are more examples of
specific training/exercising for flood incident management, but this is not a requirement nor common practice.
4. As above, but additional actors are occasionally engaged in emergency exercises (e.g., communities, private sector, and media). Training/exercising for
flood incident management is an established practice and is nationally consistent.
5. Training and exercising is initiated periodically to test planning and operational procedures for specific hazard events, including flooding, at local to
national scales. All emergency professionals are involved, and additional actors are engaged in exercises, where relevant. Exercises are seen as an
additional means of raising citizen awareness of flood risks.
I.4: Distribution of responsibilities within and between emergency actors
1. Different organizations/agencies are involved in emergency response, but there is a lack of coordinated action.
2. There is clear legislation clarifying the roles and responsibilities of emergency actors to ensure a nationally consistent approach.
3. As above, but mechanisms are in place to facilitate integrated working between emergency actors; however, this is sporadic across the country.
Mechanisms for upscaling and downscaling emergency response are in place, but reportedly lack effectiveness.
4. Mechanisms for facilitating integrated working between emergency actors are embedded in emergency management governance and practice. This
includes a range of public agencies/organizations, critical infrastructure providers, civil society organizations, and voluntary sectors. There is a clear
understanding of roles and responsibilities, and effective mechanisms for upscaling/downscaling response.
5. Opportunities are created and arrangements are in place to facilitate interorganizational working. There is a clear distinction of roles and
responsibilities and established channels for communication and information sharing. Mechanisms for upscaling and downscaling emergency response
through operational, tactical, and strategic tiers of decision-making are established.
I.5: Community preparedness
1. There is little or no attempt to consult the public about risks, not least flood risk, or make the public aware of emergency procedures.
2. Sporadic efforts are made to consult the public about risks (including flooding), but this is not nationally consistent.
3. Emergency professionals are required (whether by policy or law) to consult and inform the public about risks. This is nationally consistent. Beyond
informing about risks, there are some examples where emergency professionals have actively engaged communities in preparedness activities.
4. As above, but active engagement of communities is widespread across the country.
5. Emergency professionals are actively involved in efforts to enhance citizens’ preparedness for flooding at household and community scales, in all
administrative/emergency management districts.
(con'd)
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I.6: Provision of resources (financial, human resources, equipment, and decision support tools)
1. The resources needed to support the roles of emergency professionals are lacking.
2. There is a basic supply of necessary resources to support the roles of emergency professionals.
3. As above, but additional resources are available to support operational response to flooding (e.g., water rescue equipment); however, this is not
nationally consistent.
4. Additional resources supporting operational response to flooding are established nationally, and mechanisms are in place for sharing/distributing
resources according to need.
5. Emergency management, and flood incident management specifically, is adequately resourced in terms of funding, provision of equipment and tools
to support preparation, response and recovery activities, as well as single agency and multiagency decision-making. Additional arrangements are in
place to bring in further resources, if  required.
I.7: Arrangements for supporting recovery-based activities
1. There is little or no planning for immediate recovery following an emergency incident (flood or otherwise).
2. There is evidence of some planning for certain recovery measures (e.g., return of critical infrastructure) in some localities.
3. Emergency professionals are required (whether by policy or law) to develop recovery plans that detail roles, responsibilities, and how to assess the
impact of the event, and that outline provisions for addressing likely impacts. National guidance is provided.
4. In addition to the above, arrangements are in place at all territorial levels to trigger the handover from response to recovery phases of emergency
management and coordinate recovery activities.
5. General and flood-specific planning for recovery management is established, which deals with physical damage, humanitarian issues (e.g., dealing
with displaced communities and welfare needs of those affected), environmental issues (e.g., pollution control and decontamination), economic issues,
and infrastructure issues (e.g., reinstating critical infrastructure). Arrangements are in place for additional agencies/organizations to become involved
as required (e.g., voluntary sector to support human welfare issues). Governance structures are in place to coordinate recovery activities according to
postevent periodic impact assessments and successfully manage potential cross-border issues.
profile of flooding and prompting the development of flood
hazard and risk maps. However, this is a new exercise in Poland,
with methodologies for conducting flood risk assessments still
being developed. As such, these are yet to be fully incorporated
into emergency planning and are criticized by emergency
professionals for being too coarse. In Sweden, the low risk of
flooding simply means that specific flood risk assessments and
planning occur in a relatively ad hoc way.  
In the Netherlands and France, emergency planning is generally
considered to be significant, as—alongside generic emergency
planning—flood-specific emergency planning is pursued at
national to local or regional scales to support strategic and
operational decision-making. Emergency planning is commonly
based on local/regional hazard assessments, and often involves
vulnerability information. Nonetheless, an evaluation of
emergency planning in the Netherlands showed that there are
some regional differences in the quality of planning, with some
plans still not meeting their legal requirements (Hoekstra
Committee 2013, Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie 2013). Similarly,
in France, some municipalities still do not have their legally
required flood emergency plans in place, due mainly to a lack of
financial resources and expertise or a prioritization of other local
issues over flood risks (Larrue et al. 2016).  
Outstanding flood emergency planning is assessed in England,
where flooding is framed as a distinct problem for civil protection,
and civil contingencies legislation is reinforced in national policy
(“National Flood Emergency Framework”) (Defra 2013).
Beyond the statutory duties of emergency responders to assess
and plan for local risks integrated with vulnerability information
(recorded in Community Risk Registers), Multiagency Flood
Plans have also been developed nationwide.
Indicator 2: Arrangements for institutional learning
Institutional learning is only at an early stage of development in
Poland. Although most of the required arrangements (e.g.,
mechanisms for exchanging information on good practices,
promoting educational programs, training, and periodic and
postevent evaluations) have a statutory basis within the National
Crisis Management Planning system, they are hardly put into
practice across the country. Despite an emerging notion of
proactivity, there thus is still much room for improvement.  
In contrast, arrangements for intuitional learning are better
established and practiced in France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Although there is evidence of an increasing proactive culture,
institutional learning activities in France and Sweden still mainly
take place following significant emergency events. Nonetheless,
the ORSEC plan in France (Table 3) is periodically reviewed and
is widely valued for its coordinative potential and its adaptability
to local conditions and specific risks. In the Netherlands,
alongside of established postevent learning arrangements,
institutional learning is grounded in generic and flood-specific
emergency legislation and policies (Haasjes et al. 2012, Hoekstra
Committee 2013, Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie 2013, Havekes
and De Putter 2014). Nonetheless, there exist large regional
differences regarding the quality of periodic evaluations. In
addition, the quality and intensity of knowledge management
and exchange are regionally differentiated; thus, national
consistency is lacking (Hoekstra Committee 2013).  
In England, cultures and arrangements for institutional learning
are characteristic of the FEMS and are scored as outstanding.
For instance, online tools are available to help emergency
responders monitor and assess their performance (Cabinet Office
2012a). Furthermore, training is actively encouraged (Cabinet
Office 2015). With regard to flooding specifically, commissioned
postevent independent inquiries evaluate emergency responses
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Table 2. Summary of emergency actors in selected countries.
 
Country First responders Secondary responders Governmental departments
England Local authorities
Environment Agency
Emergency services (police, British
Transport Police, fire, Maritime and
Coastguard agency, ambulance service)
Health authorities (National Health
Service Commissioning Board, Public
Health England, foundation trusts, acute
trusts)
(These are referred to as Category 1
responders)
Utility providers (electricity, gas, water, and
sewerage, public communication providers)
Transport operators (network rail, train
operating companies, London underground
and Transport for London, airport operators,
harbor authorities, Highways Agency)
Health authorities (Health and Safety
Executive, National Health Service clinical
commissioning groups)
(These are referred to as Category 2
responders)
Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra): functions as the lead
government department at times of significant
flood emergencies (response phase)
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (department
within the Cabinet Office): coordinates central
government response
Department of Communities and Local
Government: functions as the lead government
department at times of significant flood
emergencies (recovery phase)
Local resilience forums are established for every police district in England and are
comprised of both Category 1 and 2 responders
France Municipal authorities (mayor, municipal
ward)
Emergency services (e.g, fire brigade,
police)
Utility providers (electricity, gas, drinking
water, public communication providers)
Department of Civil Protection (Home Office)
Departmental/regional prefect
Netherlands Municipal/regional authorities (mayor/
chair security region) assisted by strategic
emergency teams (including Chair of
Water Management Authority)
Operational emergency teams (tactical
and on location)
Emergency services (police, fire brigades,
medical assistance organizations)
Utility providers (electricity, gas, drinking
water, public communication providers)
Voluntary sector (e.g., Red Cross)
(These are occasionally referred to as “Crisis
Partners”)
Ministry of Security and Justice
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
Poland Municipal county/provincial authorities
(depending on an emergency scale) and
their risk management centers
Emergency services (fire brigades,
medical emergency services, police)
Utility providers (electricity, gas, drinking
water, telecommunications, transportation)
Voluntary fire brigades and other voluntary
organizations
Ministry of the Interior and Administration,
also Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transport,
Construction and Marine Economy
Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service
Sweden Local authorities
(municipal crisis management
committees)
Rescue services
Police
Utility providers (electricity, gas, drinking
water, public communication providers)
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
County administrative boards
and highlight lessons to be implemented (e.g., Pitt 2008).
Furthermore, Local Resilience Forums (Table 3) are seen as a key
mechanism for sharing experiences and good practices (Cabinet
Office 2013).
Indicator 3: Arrangements for training and exercising
Closely related to Indicator 2, arrangements for exercising and
testing planning documents are essential for effective emergency
management. England and the Netherlands both display
significant examples (Fig. 1), with specific duties established in
legislation and policies. In England, the Local Resilience Fora
typically provide a forum for frequent and hazard-specific exercises.
National-scale exercises have been performed, which also served as
a means of raising citizens’ awareness of flood risks (Exercise
Watermark Review Team 2011), but such exercises are not carried
out systematically. Likewise, exercising flood emergency situations
takes place at frequent intervals in the Netherlands. Participation
of all relevant actors (including flood professionals) is strongly
encouraged (Havekes and De Putter 2014), but in practice, the
involvement of secondary responders and citizens in exercising
procedures is considered less well established (Hoekstra Committee
2013, Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie 2013). Concerns have also been
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Fig. 1. Assessing the effectiveness of current Flood Emergency Management Systems in selected countries. (EN: England; FR: France; NL: the
Netherlands; PL: Poland; SW: Sweden; I: Indicator)
 
   
   
  
Table 3. Flood emergency planning arrangements in selected countries.
 
Country Approach to emergency planning Governing rules
England Periodic assessments of local risks recorded in Community Risk Registers (Cabinet Office
2013), performed by first responders functioning within Local Resilience Forums (LRF).
LRFs are established for every police district in England and are comprised of both first and
secondary responders (according to primary and secondary legislation). This ensures that the
wide range of emergency actors has a shared understanding of local risks, from which a
range of generic and hazard-specific planning documents are produced. Multiagency Flood
Plans are produced by the LRF to support strategic and tactical decision-making (Defra
2011).
 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Civil Contingencies (Contingency
Planning) Regulations 2005
National Flood Emergency
Framework (Defra 2013)
France At the national scale, the Plan ORSEC is compiled by the departmental prefecture with the
Inter-departmental Service of Defense and Civil Security. Mayors must develop specific
emergency plans, namely Municipal Rescue Plans; this is compulsory for municipalities at
risk of flooding, where Flood Prevention Plans have to be established.
 
Act on Modernization of Civil
Security in 2004
Netherlands Boards of Security Regions are required to produce generic strategic emergency plans based
on regularly updated risk profiles of the region, as well as operational crisis plans. Aligned to
the Security Regions’ plans, Water Management Authorities produce flood-specific calamity
plans, including provisions for flood incident management.
 
Security Regions Act 2010
Water Act 2009
Poland The Report on Threats to the National Security sets the basis for the National Crisis
Management Planning and for civil planning executed on provincial, county, and municipal
levels. The implementation of Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) has prompted the development
of flood hazard maps and flood risk management plans.
 
Crisis Management Act 2007
Sweden All municipalities, county councils, county administrative boards, and central agencies are
required to compile risk and vulnerability assessments. Where flooding has been identified as
a risk at the local scale, it is to be incorporated into the local emergency management
committees’ generic emergency plan. For general emergency preparedness, relevant
authorities are divided into six so-called “collaboration areas,” which are responsible for
establishing specific emergency plans.
 
Act on Extraordinary Incidents and
the regulations on emergency
preparedness
Government Bill 2001/02:158
expressed about differences in the quality and frequency of
regional emergency exercises, due mostly to the lack of experience
and resources (Hoekstra Committee 2013).  
Training and exercising are moderately established in France,
Poland, and Sweden. In France, emergency exercises are a
statutory requirement, but flood-specific exercises are not
mandatory. As far as flood-specific exercises have taken place,
there is no national consistency in doing so. Similarly, multihazard
training in Poland is typically organized at the provincial level,
but there has been a limited number of flood-focused exercises,
and nonemergency responders (i.e., private and other public
sector companies) have limited involvement (Matczak and
Abgarowicz 2013). In Sweden, the low risk of flooding (especially
in comparison with other risks, such as forest fires, storms) means
that flood exercises are not common practice unless prioritized
as a relevant risk at the local level.
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Table 4. Distribution of responsibilities within and between emergency actors in selected countries.
 
Country Distribution of responsibilities within and between emergency actors
England Emergency response is coordinated through a tiered command structure, convened at operational, tactical, and strategic levels. Tactical
and Strategic Coordinating Groups (multiactor) will coordinate emergency actors as an event escalates (HM Government 2012).
Crucially, no single responding agency has command control. In times of regional or national emergencies, coordination occurs through
the lead government department or through the Civil Contingencies Secretariat for Level 2 to 3 emergencies. There is a duty for first and
secondary responders to cooperate and share information. The voluntary sector may provide support (e.g., British Civil Defense Corps),
but this is often ad hoc.
 
France During local-scale emergency, responsibility resides with the mayor and can be transferred to the departmental prefect as events escalate
to supralocal scales, or to the zonal prefect. With regard to large-scale emergency events (e.g., flood events), the French territory is
divided into six “zones of defense.” Within this pyramidal organization, the Inter-Departmental Ministerial Centre for Crisis
Management is a key actor and, for instance, plays a central role in national flood monitoring, forecasting, and broadcasting. For
secondary water courses (which are not managed by the state but by local authorities), local forecasting systems are widely available.
 
Netherlands For local emergency events, the responsibility for coordinating actors resides with the mayor, who is responsible for strategic decision-
making and formally has supreme command over all actors involved in response. For supralocal emergency events, this responsibility is
transferred to the chair of a security region, who will be supported by a regional emergency team consisting of representatives of all
emergency services and other relevant parties, such as a representative of the relevant water management authority. For extreme
supraregional events, ultimately the Minister of Security and Justice can take over command. Tactical coordination and operational lead
at location takes place through operational teams, chaired by an operational leader and consisting of representatives of all emergency
services and other relevant actors if  needed. Although secondary responders (“crisis partners”) have no statutory duties, emergency
authorities are encouraged to establish agreements with crisis partners about their specific role in emergency planning and response
(typically through covenants).
 
Poland Coordinating responsibilities are upscaled from the mayor to the provincial governor, and ultimately, the prime minister as events
escalate. Crisis management centers and crisis management teams are established accordingly. These organizations constitute an
information sharing and coordinative backbone, while operational capacities are organized through the National Firefighting and
Rescue System. This system relies mostly on the state fire brigades, but also the voluntary fire brigades and specialized agencies (e.g.,
medical emergency services) are actively involved in response. About half  of the 16,000 voluntary fire brigade’s units are integrated into
the National Firefighting and Rescue System.
 
Sweden Municipal crisis management committees have a statutory duty and specific competencies to coordinate response activities. In case of
supralocal/national events, the county administrative board or ultimately the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency will coordinate
response. Secondary responders have a duty to cooperate and share information. This follows from the basic principle that everyone who
is responsible for an activity under normal conditions also has responsibility in emergency situations (e.g., SOU 2007, MSB 2012). The
role of secondary responders in Sweden is further formalized within the framework of so-called “collaboration areas.”
 
Indicator 4: Distribution of responsibilities within and between
emergency actors
Effective emergency response is dependent on an appropriate
organization and coordination between emergency actors. All
countries have established specific and highly differing
organizational structures and arrangements for coordination
(Table 4, Fig. 1). Nonetheless, they are all based on the principle
of subsidiarity, which advocates the devolution of decision-
making to the lowest appropriate scale, with collaboration and
coordination at the highest level necessary (Henstra 2010, Buijze
2014). The arrangements in place for facilitating integrated
working between actors and transferring responsibilities in all
countries are structured according to the type and scale of the
incident (i.e., the geographical spread and societal impacts) (Table
3). A comparison, furthermore, reveals differences regarding the
cooperation between first and secondary responders, which is
ensured by statutory duties to cooperate and share information
(England and Sweden), to more informal arrangements (e.g.,
through covenants) in the Netherlands, and ad hoc cooperation
(France and Poland). Further differences are observed in relation
to the involvement of the voluntary sector, as well as decision-
making structures.  
All countries’ systems, except the Netherlands’, are evaluated as
significant for this indicator. The new organizational structure in
the Netherlands (implemented in 2010) is generally considered to
be a major improvement (Muller 2014), but still, upscaling
emergencies to supraregional levels requires some crystallization
(Hoekstra Committee 2013, Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie 2013).
Moreover, especially concerning flood incidents, there is a reported
lack of clarity about the division of responsibilities and
competences of emergency and water management authorities; the
so-called generic and functional chains have not yet been properly
aligned or integrated (Havekes and De Putter 2014, Muller 2014).
Communication and information exchange systems have also
proven to be ineffective in some specific emergency situations
(Hoekstra Committee 2013).  
Although the organizational and coordinative structures are
considered highly effective, in England an identified weakness
relates to the inclusion of the voluntary sector. While first
responders must demonstrate due consideration of voluntary
groups, there is no formal obligation to involve them; actual
involvement thus is highly variable from one Local Resilience
Forum to another, despite coordinated promotional activities (e.g.,
the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum, Cabinet Office 2013).
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In contrast, voluntary sector involvement is considered to be a
key strength of the Polish system, but a general weakness thereof
concerns the lack of effective mechanisms to promote
coordinated working. Coordination and cooperation, thus, often
take place in a somewhat ad hoc manner, as in France.
Indicator 5: Community preparedness
Community preparedness requires emergency professionals to be
actively engaged in efforts to enhance citizens’ awareness of flood
risks and preparedness to flooding at household and community
scales, in all administrative and emergency management districts.
Efforts to enhance community preparedness to flood events are
increasingly witnessed in the selected countries, in an effort to
increase self-reliance and resilience at the local scale. Despite these
efforts, there are considerable differences witnessed as to the
degree of community preparedness in the selected countries (Fig.
1).  
In the Netherlands and Poland, arrangements for enhancing
community preparedness are still in an early stage of development
and appear to be constrained by societal expectations that the
state is responsible for preventing flooding and guaranteeing
safety (Kaufmann et al. 2016, Matczak et al. 2016). This is
understandable in the Netherlands, given that statutory rights to
flood defense exist and high legal safety standards are established
(Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). In Poland, this attitude could
be partially explained by the legacy of the omnipotent Communist
state. Nonetheless, there are still examples where citizens are
actively engaged in the FEMS. In Poland, this includes the
voluntary fire service and examples of local “flood leaders” (e.g.,
City of Wroclaw), although this constitutes a pilot initiative at
this stage (Matczak et al. 2016). National and regional/local
campaigns and informative websites are employed in the
Netherlands to raise risk awareness, but despite these activities,
community preparedness remains low (OECD 2014, Kaufmann
et al. 2016).  
Community preparedness is established to a higher degree in
France and Sweden (Ek et al. 2016, Larrue et al. 2016).
“Professionalization” of the public is one of the major aims of
the French FEMS, where voluntary fire brigades play a key role.
Municipalities can optionally call in voluntary civil protection
reserves to assist in response activities. The intent is to train a
specific group of volunteers who are capable of assisting the
population, thereby providing “competent” support to emergency
professionals. Although not yet highly established, these efforts
to enhance community preparedness are becoming nationally
more consistent. In Sweden, a network of so-called River Groups
has been established since the mid 1990s to (1) disseminate
knowledge about watercourses, (2) facilitate flood risk planning,
and (3) improve flood emergency management through
cooperation. In addition to these voluntary-based associations,
information websites and campaigns by the Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency aim to raise flood risk awareness.  
Only in England, community preparedness is outstanding, given
the vast range of community initiatives that take place (Alexander
et al. 2016). For example, community flood action groups are
established by members of the public and typically work in
partnership with certain first responders (namely local authorities
and the Environment Agency), as well as the National Flood
Forum (a registered charity). A key activity is the development of
community flood action plans (Cabinet Office 2011, Environment
Agency 2012). Voluntary-based community flood wardens are
also established in some areas to facilitate communication of
official warning messages. This accompanies more passive forms
of engaging local communities and making them aware of their
local flood risk (e.g., interactive web-based flood mapping, mobile
apps, publically available risk assessments).
Indicator 6: Provision of resources
There is no indication that the FEMS of the selected countries
are severely lacking resources. Emergency management in all
countries is mainly publicly funded through general means
generated at the central and/or decentralized level. In some
countries (England, the Netherlands, and Sweden), additional
funding by central government is also available under specific
conditions. In Poland and France, such arrangements for
additional funding are not present. Nonetheless, financial
resources for emergency management in all selected countries are
generally estimated to be sufficient.  
In terms of human resources, English local authorities can request
support from neighboring local authorities in times of need on
the basis of Mutual Aid Agreements. Historically, this has been
somewhat “patchy” across the country, but the need for
established such agreements was emphasized following the
summer floods in 2007 (Pitt 2008). In the Netherlands,
understaffing within the emergency management authorities is
considered an issue, leading to a limited administrative (planning)
capacity, especially during the preparation phase. Also in Sweden,
staffing is reported as a key obstacle for effective emergency
management, although the leading authorities have powers to
raise support from other agencies and municipalities, or even
instruct citizen participation. In all countries, additional
humanpower can be summoned in emergency response activities
through the voluntary sector, albeit this is less established in some
countries (e.g., the Netherlands) in comparison to others (e.g.,
France and Poland).  
All countries have a wide range of technical and technological
recourses available to support flood preparation, response, and
recovery activities. In England, for instance, web-based interfaces
act as portals for data sharing to facilitate joined-up working.
Moreover, a national asset register of emergency resources is
available, which may be called upon by all relevant agencies and
organizations in the event of an emergency (Defra 2013). Whereas
communication and information exchange facilities in the
Netherlands have proven ineffective during a number of
emergency situations, equipment for flood emergency
management is widely available with emergency and water
management authorities across the country. Although there has
been considerable improvement in terms of financing and
providing equipment, resources appear to be less committed
toward the FEMS in Poland. Indeed, recent flood incidents
exposed equipment and staff  shortages (Matczak et al. 2016).
Indicator 7: Arrangements for supporting recovery-based
activities
Arrangements for supporting recovery-based activities are
established in the selected countries to varying degrees (Fig. 1).
In England and Sweden, where this is scored as significant, such
arrangements are firmly established within the respective FEMS,
with national policies and legal guidance outlining clear
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mechanisms for transitioning from response to recovery phases
(Alexander et al. 2016, Ek et al. 2016). For example, Recovery
Coordinating Groups are established in England (Defra 2013),
and first responders have a statutory duty to provide advice and
assist business and the voluntary sector with business continuity
planning to ensure the continuance of activities during flood to
postflood events (Cabinet Office 2013).  
Also, the French FEMS contains policies regarding the transition
from response to recovery, including specific arrangements for
downscaling responsibilities, and initiating aftercare activities.
For instance, the Institute of Major Risks provides some recovery
guidance, but contrary to England, this is not substantively
regulated, and regional differences in performance are observed.
In the Netherlands, such arrangements are less well established
compared to the French system, and there is hardly any national
guidance in this respect. Nonetheless, recovery-based policies are
increasingly established at the regional levels, and postevent
activities, such as evaluations of performance and the
reconstruction of damaged flood defense infrastructures, are
more strictly regulated in the Netherlands (Havekes and De Putter
2014, Muller 2014). Additionally, critical infrastructure operators
(e.g., electricity network operators and drinking water companies)
are legally required to repair their networks and continue their
services as soon as reasonably possible after an emergency event
(Runhaar et al. 2015).  
In Poland, arrangements for recovery-based activities remain in
an early stage of development. For instance, recovery plans are
occasionally established as a part of emergency planning, but this
is not legally required and not necessarily common practice
(Matczak et al 2016).
DISCUSSION
On the basis of our preliminary findings, the cross-country
comparison we performed reveals important nuances in how
flood emergency management is delivered in the selected
countries. A general observation is the existence of similar
practices in FEMS. For instance, they share the same underlying
goals and principles, promote an integrated multiactor approach,
proactive planning, and institutional learning through training
exercises and systematic evaluations. However, there is also a
number of differences in how emergency management systems
have substantively evolved and the degree to which they have
developed in relation to the benchmarks evaluated (Table 1, Fig.
1). These differences can be accounted for in light of differing
contextual backgrounds, related to political, administrative,
cultural, and socio-economic factors, as well as differing
exposures to flood hazard.  
For instance, the English system is scored as significant or
outstanding for all indicators. In contrast to the other selected
countries, diversified arrangements of flood risk management
strategies have been employed for circa 65 years to address all
aspects of risk in England (Alexander et al. 2016). This is
encouraged largely by the absence of a statutory right to flood
protection and statutory safety standards (as seen in the
Netherlands). Thus, flood emergency management has served as
a crucial strategy for minimizing the consequences of flood events
and has evolved incrementally. Today, emergency management is
embedded within the National Resilience Capabilities
Programme, with a specific work stream dedicated to flood
emergency management (Cabinet Office 2013). Formal legal
mechanisms underpin effective integrated working between
emergency responders (e.g., duties to cooperate, and formation
of Local Resilience Forums). Moreover, community engagement
is highly established and steered through wider efforts to devolve
responsibilities to the local scale. Although legal responsibility
ultimately resides with citizens themselves, this shift is also
attributed to financial drivers and concerns for the future
sustainability of flood risk management (Alexander et al. 2016).
Collectively, these factors account for the high effectiveness of the
FEMS.  
Similar to England, the cornerstone of the Swedish system is that
individuals have the primary responsibility to protect themselves
and their property (e.g., SOU 2007:31, MSB 2012). The model
for Swedish emergency management is based on the fact that all
crises occur at the local level; therefore, preparedness and the
ability to manage emergencies must be built bottom up (Prop.
2001/02:158). In light of the low distribution of flood risk, this
means that specific provisions for flood emergency management
have not been established at the national scale, although the
emergency management system more broadly is generally
regarded as effective (Ek et al. 2016). Instead, flood emergency
management is developed on an ad hoc basis by those
municipalities affected by flooding. Arguably, this constitutes a
more efficient strategy and provides the necessary flexibility for
municipalities to adapt to local risks (Fiselier and Oosterberg
2004). However, this can also be considered as a weakness, as
some geographical areas may be neglected. Moreover,
municipalities or public agencies must mobilize the necessary
resources, which can pose a challenge at a time of strained
finances, albeit government compensation can be sought to
support this (Ek et al. 2016).  
Although most key aspects of the Dutch emergency management
system are established in policies and legislation, certain aspects
of flood emergency management specifically (i.e., institutional
learning, community engagement, and recovery) are less well
developed, or still show practical deficiencies, thereby impeding
its effectiveness. This can, however, be understood within the
context of a normative stance that floods should be prevented at
all costs and the related legally established high safety standards
for flood defense (Wiering et al. 2015). Although the traditional
Dutch defense-based strategy has proven rather effective over
time, recent policy developments aim at diversifying and
developing other flood risk management strategies as part of a
risk-based, multilayered safety approach (Kaufmann et al. 2016).
However, the organizational structure (especially concerning the
division of responsibilities and competences between emergency
and water management authorities in emergency situations)
requires some improvement.  
In contrast to the other countries, the FEMS in Poland is still
emerging in several aspects. This can be related to the significant
ideological shift from the Communist regime and the impact of
this legacy, which means that change can be slow to take effect.
The occurrence of significant floods (e.g., the 1997 “Millennium
Flood”) has played an important role in accelerating structural
changes in the emergency management system (Matczak et al.
2013, 2016, Sadowski 2013). Likewise, several features of flood
emergency management are lagging behind in France. In part,
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this can be attributed to a broader transition toward decentralized
governance. Indeed, amendments to civil security in 2004 assert
the responsibility of private citizens for their own safety. However,
this is slow to develop within an ideological background of
solidarity, a principle established within the national constitution
(Larrue et al. 2016).  
This analysis highlights the importance of understanding FEMS
within the legal, administrative, political, and cultural contexts in
which they have emerged and currently operate. While it is
generally agreed that a “one size fits all” approach is not
applicable, the added value of comparison is that it can shed light
on potentially shared constraints for increasing the effectiveness
of FEMS. One this front, a number of constraints are identified,
such as the underdevelopment of practices and cultures for
institutional learning, resource constraints in terms of staffing
and expertise, and lack of consistent protocols for recovery-based
activities. Another important constraint appears to stem from the
tension between each nation’s stance on emergency management
governance (i.e., requests for citizens to be self-reliant) and
citizens’ expectations that the state should intervene and offer
protection from hazardous events. This attitude is particularly
evident in the Netherlands and Poland (Kaufmann et al. 2016,
Matczak et al. 2016). Even in England, where community
engagement is standard practice, interviews with emergency
professions revealed a degree of reluctance to let the public assist
in the local response to a flood emergency (Alexander et al. 2016).
This can be attributed to the perception that citizens are not
formally trained and may risk putting themselves in danger,
thereby becoming a liability rather than an asset to the response
effort.  
A final constraint that emerged from this analysis refers to how
flood risk is nationally prioritized, which has a clear impact on
how rules and practices are made nationally consistent. However,
as the analysis of Swedish FEMS shows, national consistency (as
outlined in Table 1) may not be so important in the context of
low flood risk and high spatial variability across the country.
While the evaluation framework we presented reviews
predominantly the national FEMS, different results may be
obtained at the local scale. Nonetheless, on the basis of this review,
a number of general recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of FEMS can be made and potentially extended to
areas with similar contextual settings:  
. Flood emergency management is embedded within broader
emergency management frameworks, which ensure that
resources are shared across different types of hazard events
and that risks are proportionately managed. However,
specific provisions for flood emergency management could
prove beneficial in countries where flood risk is projected to
increase. Lessons could be learned from the multiagency
flood planning and subgroups within Local Resilience Fora
seen in England, which provide further clarity on roles and
responsibilities at times of flood emergencies. 
. In countries exposed to low flood risk, or where flooding is
highly spatially distributed, national-level guidance could
support preparatory, response, and recovery activities
specifically tailored to flooding at the local scale. This would
ensure some consistency between those areas that are
affected by flooding and would help establish good
practices. 
. Specific training exercises for flood emergencies should take
place periodically to serve the dual purpose of (1) testing
planning documents, responsive procedures, and communication
structures, and (2) raising citizens’ awareness of local to
national flood risks. 
. Efforts to encourage community preparedness require better
communication of flood risks and the distribution of formal
responsibilities, and need to be situated alongside wider
efforts to normalize adaptation within society.
CONCLUSION
Addressing a neglected research gap, we formulate and apply a
framework for evaluating the effectiveness of FEMS in selected
European countries. Cross-country analysis reveals important
nuances in how flood emergency management is delivered, among
a number of shared strengths and weaknesses in current
approaches. Considerable strengths are observed in areas of both
generic and flood-specific proactive emergency planning, and the
organization and coordination between emergency responders.
However, common weaknesses are discerned in the context of
institutional learning, community preparedness, and recovery.  
Observed differences are attributed to the evolution of emergency
management through different institutional cultures, socio-
economic conditions, and political processes. Different flood risk
profiles and approaches to flood risk governance also account for
variations in the delivery of flood incident management. While
this raises implications for the transferability of examples of good
practice, the comparative approach we presented serves as a useful
tool for identifying such practices and debating their
transferability potential. Overall, the evaluation framework we
presented can be conceived as a valuable mechanism for steering
intra- and inter-country assessment and monitoring of current
FEMS over time. This can support the evaluation of flood
emergency management policies, help identify constraints and
opportunities for improving the effectiveness of flood emergency
management, and provide evidence for targeting future
investment.  
Further research is warranted to examine the applicability of this
framework to other EU Member States and other countries.
Furthermore, the approach for performing the benchmark
assessment we presented relies on the informed interpretation of
the researchers, albeit grounded in extensive document analysis
and stakeholder interviews. An extension of this would be to elicit
stakeholder perspectives in scoring, and potentially weighting the
benchmarks according to their perceived impact on the
effectiveness of emergency management, thus merging qualitative
and quantitative methodologies. Nonetheless, the research we
presented is a necessary step forward in the study of flood
emergency management systems, and provides a firm basis for
more indepth evaluations and cross-country comparison
thereafter.
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